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PATENT LAW - PATENTABILITY POST-BILSKI: No NEED TO THROW THE
BABY OUT WITH THE BATH WATER WHEN DETERMINING SUBJECT MATTER
ELIGIBILITY UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine betting everything you own on black ten. Now imagine the
overwhelming feeling of disbelief and despair you face when the roulette
wheel lands on red thirty, and your entire life savings vanishes with a single
sweep of the croupier's rake. In Bilski v. Kappos,' the Court had the poten-
tial to cause the same kind of emotional distress and financial hardship for
innovators. Fortunately, the Supreme Court of the United States, delivering
its opinion on the final day of the 2009-2010 session, preserved thousands of
patents worldwide. Unfortunately, however, the Court's ruling undermined
twenty years of patentability precedent, leaving inventors and patent profes-
sionals without clear direction.
Title 35, § 101 of the United States Code provides that patents are
available to "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provement thereof.' ' 2 Over the years, the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office (USPTO, the "patent office," or the "Board") and the federal
courts have applied different tests for determining patent eligibility, but
common language leads to what is known as the machine-or-transformation
test.3 Although the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled in In re
Bilski that this test is the test for determining patent eligibility under § 101,'
the Supreme Court concluded on appeal that the machine-or-transformation
test, while a useful and important clue, "is not the sole test for deciding
whether an invention is ... patent-eligible" subject matter.5
1. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
3. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 70 (1972) ("Transformation and reduction of an article 'to a different state or thing'
is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.");
Parker v. Hook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978) (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788
(1876) ("An argument can be made ... that this Court has only recognized a process as
within the statutory definition when it either was tied to a particular apparatus or operated to
change materials to a 'different state or thing."'); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788
(1876) ("A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is
an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to
a different state or thing.").
4. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
5. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (emphasis added).
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Because the Court did not provide guidance with respect to any of the
other tests that have previously been used to determine whether processes
are patentable, the USPTO has scrambled to develop new guidelines for
determining patentability. The Supreme Court has consistently held that
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable;
6
however, other subject matters are not as clearly defined. Although practi-
tioners will continue writing patent claims that meet the machine-or-
transformation test, this test alone is insufficient because it cannot easily be
applied to software and process' inventions.
By employing the previously used tests along with the machine-or-
transformation test and the interim Bilski guidelines,8 the USPTO can create
practical guidelines to answer the question of patentability regarding inven-
tions that fall between patentable machine-or-transformation subject matter
and an unpatentable abstract idea. These standards will provide the flexibil-
ity desired by the Supreme Court9 while continuing to allow patent laws to
serve the intended purpose of promoting innovation."
This note will provide an overview of the Patent Act," a description of
the various tests for determining patent eligibility that led to the use of the
machine-or-transformation test, 2 a discussion of the Bilski decision and the
problems it has created, 3 as well as suggestions for creating a working test
practitioners can use when drafting patent claims."
II. BACKGROUND
Granted through the U.S. Constitution, the power to issue and regulate
patents lies with Congress.' Although initially fearful of monopolies like
6. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
7. "The term 'process' means process, art, or method, and includes a new use of a
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material." 35 U.S.C. §
100(b) (2006).
8. Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in
View of Bilski v. Kappos, U. S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Mar. 7, 2011, 12:50 PM),
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/announce/bilski-guidance.jsp.
9. See infra Part III.
10. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., U.S. DEP'T OF COM., THE STORY OF THE U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE iv. (1988). "The patent system is the best, most workable method yet
devised for protecting inventions, fostering industrial and technical progress, and ultimately
giving to the world the benefits of the individual inventor's genius." Id.
11. See infra Parts II.A and II.B.
12. See infra Part II.C.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part III.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;" Id.
[Vol. 34
PATENT LAW
those under the old English system, the constitutional delegates understood
the importance of patents and allowed Congress to enact the first patent
law. 6 It was under this power that Congress, with additional encouragement
from President George Washington, established a committee that presented
and passed the first patent bill.17 From this bill,18 the modem patent system
gradually evolved.19
A. Major Changes to Patent Law
Under the Patent Act of 1790, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
War, and the Attorney General were responsible for granting patents. ° The
system was designed to be an examination system, which required the patent
office to review each application.21 Under this Act, fifty-five patents were
granted.:2
In 1793, patent law underwent a substantial change with the removal of
the subject-matter condition that previously required inventions to be "suffi-
ciently useful and important.,,23 Additionally, the patent system moved to a
registration-based system due to the difficulties the patent office faced in
splitting time between its regular duties and the duties of examining and
administering patents. Under the registration system, patent applications
were no longer examined; instead, patents were granted to all that "ap-
plie[d], submit[ted] the proper drawings, and pa[id] the necessary fee.
25
This process remained in effect for the next forty-three years.26
16. THE STORY OF THE U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 10, at v. The
first patent law was the Patent Act of 1790. Id. at 1.
17. Id. "On March 4, 1789, government under the new Constitution began operations,
and on January 8, 1790, President Washington addressed the second session of the First Con-
gress meeting in New York City, urging the representatives to give 'effectual encouragement
... to the exertion of skill and genius at home."' Id.
18. Id. at 1. The passage of this bill became known as the Patent Act of 1790. Id.
19. Id. at 1-2.
20. Id. at 1.
21. Id. at 1-2.
22. THE STORY OF THE U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 10, at 2. The
first patent was granted to Samuel Hopkins on July 31, 1790, "for an improvement in 'the
making of Pot ash and Pearl ash by a new Apparatus and Process,"' and George Washington,
then President of the United States, Edmund Randolph, then Attorney General, and Thomas





26. Id. at 2-6.
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The Patent Act of 1836 changed patent law again, resulting in the rees-
tablishment of the "American" system of granting patents.27 This Act
brought back the examination system, requiring all applications to be exam-
ined for their novelty and usefulness. 28 With the exception of the 1790 Act,
which created the patent system, this was the most important patent law
enacted by the United States as it formed the basis for the patent laws in
effect today.
The last major revision to the United States patent laws came with the
Patent Act of 1952 when Title 35 of the United States Code was enacted.3 °
The basis of Title 35 is simple-any person who has invented "any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent."31 In order to obtain a
patent, one must simply file an application, accompanied by the proper pa-
pers describing the invention, with the Commissioner of Patents and Trade-
marks and pay the fee.32 "The [USPTO] then searches prior patents and pub-
lications to determine whether the application presents something pat-
entable," ensuring it is new and useful.3 3 Although these requirements ini-
tially appear straightforward, their interpretation has been the subject of
much debate.34 Nonetheless, the number of patents has continued to rise,35
from three patents issued in 179336 to 244,341 issued in 2010.
3
1
B. Title 35 of the United States Code
The statute currently outlining subject-matter patentability is 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, which provides that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title. ' 38 Although there are other pat-
27. Id. at 6.
28. THE STORY OF THE U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 10, at 6.
29. See id.
30. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006).
31. Id. § 101.
32. THE STORY OF THE U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 10, at iii.
33. Id.
34. See infra Part II.C.
35. THE STORY OFTHEU.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 10, at 43-46.
36. Id. at 43.
37. U.S. Patents Statistic Chart Calendar Years from 1963-2011, U. S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. (Jan. 18, 2012, 2:38 PM),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us-stat.htm.
38. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Note how little has changed since the Patent Act of 1790,
which defined subject matter as "any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or
any improvement therein not before known or used." See Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1
Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).
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entability requirements, outlined primarily in §§ 102,39 103, 40 and 1 12,41 this
note will focus on § 101 as it is the threshold for determining if the subject
matter is eligible for patenting. Section 101 addresses the two-prong test
that must be satisfied in order for an invention to be patentable. The first
prong provides that an invention must be new and useful.42 The second
prong requires that an invention fall within one of the following four catego-
ries: "a process; a machine (also known as an apparatus); a manufacture
(also known as an article); [or] a composition of matter."43 The second
prong has been the subject of much debate and litigation.
44
C. The Various Tests Used to Determine Patent Eligibility Leading to the
Machine-or-Transformation Test
As previously mentioned, "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas" cannot be patented.45 In Gottschalk v. Benson,46 the Supreme
Court explained that "[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are
the basic tools of scientific and technological work., 47 In Diamond v.
Diehr,48 however, the Court held that "anything under the sun that is made
by man" should be patentable, 49 and the "transformation and reduction of an
article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to [its] patentability."5 This
language formed the machine-or-transformation test, which has been used
for several years to determine initial patentability under § 101. What falls
between a patentable machine-or-transformation and an unpatentable
39. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
40. Id. § 103.
41. Id. § 112.
42. John Hammond & Robert Gunderman, The Limited Monopoly: Patent Law 101-
What Is Patentable?, THE ROCHESTER ENG'R, June 2007, at 6, 6.
43. Id.
44. Id. ("Historically, this latter requirement has been where much of the controversy
exists.").
45. E.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,309 (1980).
46. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
47. Id. at 67. The Court does not say any invention including, or built upon, phenomena,
laws of nature, or an abstract idea could never be patented. Instead, the Court quotes itself in
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948), where it said that "[h]e
who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it
which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come
from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end." Id. Additionally, the Court
explained that "while a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a pat-
entable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific
truth may be." Id. (quoting Mackay Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939)).
48. 450U.S. 175 (1981).
49. Id. at 182.
50. Id. at 184 (quoting Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 70).
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abstract idea gives rise to much confusion within the area of patent law,
making any patentability determination controversial. This gray area in-
cludes software, digital programs, and business processes.
1. Rules of the Abrams Test
In In re Abrams,51 the appellant sought review of the USPTO's rejec-
tion of the claims presented in his application for a petroleum prospecting
method.52 The Board rejected the application on the basis "that the steps in
the claims which constitute the heart of the invention [were] purely mental
in character," and they failed to describe a process involving eligible subject
matter.53 On appeal, the court was asked to apply the following three "rules
of law" to cases that contain so-called mental steps 4:
1. If all the steps of a method claim are purely mental in character, the
subject matter thereof is not patentable within the meaning of the patent
statutes.
2. If a method claim embodies both positive and physical steps as well
as so-called mental steps, yet the alleged novelty or advance over the art
resides in one or more of the so-called mental steps, then the claim is
considered unpatentable for the same reason that it would be if all the
steps were purely mental in character.
3. If a method claim embodies both positive and physical steps as well
as so-called mental steps, yet the novelty or advance over the art resides
in one or more of the positive and physical steps and the so-called mental
step or steps are incidental parts of the process which are essential to de-
51. 188F.2d165(C.C.P.A. 1951).
52. Id. at 165. The primary examiner determined that while the invention involved a new
and useful method of prospecting for petroleum deposits, steps involved were mainly mental
in nature and therefore non-statutory. Id. at 167.
This mental process is indicated by such terms in the claims as "calculating" ap-
plied for instance to mathematically making certain computations from figures
taken down from pressure observation, "comparing" applied to mere mental
comparison of figures on a sheet[, "converting" as related to mathematically
calculating the flow data or pressure rise with respect to a standard reference
pressure, "determining" applied, for instance, to the reading of the pressure rise
figures[, and] "correcting" involving mere mathematical calculations.
Id. (quoting "the statement of the examiner following the appeal to the [B]oard").
53. These claims were rejected pursuant to Section 4886 R.S.. Id. at 165. Section 4886
R.S. was included in § 31 of the former Title 35, which was modified by the Patent Act of
1952 one year after this case was decided. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
54. In re Abrams, 188 F.2d at 166.
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fine, qualify or limit its scope, then the claim is patentable and not sub-
ject to the objections contained in 1 and 2 above.
55
The appellant suggested these rules to the examiner, who mentioned
them in his reply brief to the Board.5 6 "tN]either the examiner nor the
[B]oard," however, "expressed either approval o[r] disapproval" of these
rules.57 Furthermore, the court also affirmed the patent rejection without
adopting or rejecting these rules.58
Although the Board did not expressly adopt the "Rules of Abrams," it
appears these rules have been used as a basis for its rejection of claims pre-
sented by subsequent patent applications. 59 As the court noted in In re
Prater,6 ° there has been much confusion regarding the precedential value of
Abrams, which results from the erroneous belief that the decision was a ju-
dicial adoption of the rules presented by Abrams' attorney.61
2. The Technological Arts Test
By 1970, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
62
(C.C.P.A) had expressly rejected the "Rules of Abrams" and had employed
the "technological arts" test instead, stating "[a]ll that is necessary . . . to
make a sequence of operational steps a statutory 'process' within 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in consonance with the
55. Id. The appellant's "brief state[d] that the proposed rules were formulated on behalf
of [the] appellant from a review of many decisions, and it said: 'Appellant strongly feels that
this court should adopt the three rules promulgated ..., or some modification thereof, in
order that some rule of reason which is readily understandable to all can be applied to these
mental step cases."' Id.
56. Id. at 167.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 888 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ("Since the three so-called
"Rules of Abrams" appear to have been the legal basis of both decisions below.., we deem
it appropriate to state at the outset our position as to those so-called rules ...."); In re Prader,
415 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (where the examiner cited portions of In reAbrams
as support for his position that certain "claims to a mental process [were] unpatentable," and
the Board affirmed).
60. 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
61. Id. at 1386.
62. This court was established in 1909, but it did not acquire jurisdiction to hear patent
appeal cases until 1929. History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD. CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts-special_cpa.html (last visited Jan.30, 2012).
In 1982, the Federal Courts Improvement Act abolished the C.C.P.A., transferring its juris-
diction, docket, and judges to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See
id.; Landmark Judicial Legislation, FED. JUD. CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_22.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
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Constitutional purpose to promote the progress of 'useful arts."' 63 The court
affirmed the technological arts test in In re Foster64 where it stated that
"[u]nder this analysis it is not important whether the claims contain mental
steps or not if the process is within the technological arts. 65
The court again applied the technological arts test in In re Benson
66
when it reversed the Board's rejection and held that the application claims
were within the statutory subject matter allowed by § 101.67 The Supreme
Court later reversed this decision in Gottschalk v. Benson.68 In Gottschalk,
the Court held that the respondent's method for converting numerical infor-
mation from binary-coded decimal (BCD) numbers into pure binary num-
bers for use in programming conventional general-purpose computers was
merely a series of mathematical calculations or mental steps, which did not
constitute a patentable process. 69 The Court held that "[tiransformation and
reduction of an article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to the pat-
entability of a process claim that does not include particular machines."7°
Because the claim was a series of mathematical calculations, the Court de-
termined it was not limited to any particular art or technology, to any par-
ticular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end use, but rather it was
"so abstract and sweeping[,] ... cover[ing] both known and unknown uses,"
that it did not constitute a patentable process.7' Furthermore, since the BCD
conversion could be performed on any existing computer, or even without a
computer, to grant this process a patent would be equivalent to patenting the
algorithm itself.72 However, the Court expressly noted that it did not "hold
that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements
of [its] prior precedents. 73
In Parker v. Flook,74 the Court addressed process patentability where
an algorithm is tied to a particular post-solution activity.75 The examiner
63. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). "It remains our view
that we need not be encumbered in our reasoning by the 'Rules' of Abrams for the reason that
they have never enjoyed the approval of this court." Id. at 889.
64. 438 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
65. Id. at 1015. "In the present case there can be no dispute that the process of removing
distortion from seismograms is within the technological arts as was the closely related proc-
ess of correcting seismic data in Musgrave. Therefore, we conclude that the method claims
are directed to a statutory process." Id.
66. 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
67. Id. at 688.
68. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972).
69. Id. at 65-66, 71-72.
70. Id. at 70.
71. Id. at 68, 71-72.
72. Id. at 67, 71-72.
73. Id. at 71.
74. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
75. Id. at 585.
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rejected the respondent's method for updating alarm limits during a catalytic
conversion process on the grounds that a mathematical formula was the only
difference between the claims and prior art, and the Board affirmed.76 The
examiner noted "that the claims did not describe a discovery that was eligi-
ble for patent protection," and "a patent on this method 'would in practical
effect be a patent on the formula or mathematics itself."' 77 The Court stated
that "[t]he line between a patentable 'process' and an unpatentable 'princi-
ple' is not always clear. Both are 'conception[s] of the mind, seen only by
[their] effects when being executed or performed."8
3. The Freeman-Walter-Abele Test
Another test for determining subject-matter eligibility, the Freeman-
Walter-Abele test ("FWA test"), emerged through a series of C.C.P.A. deci-
sions.79 This test provided a two-step analysis for determining patentability
under § 101.80 Under the FWA test, the claim is first analyzed to determine
whether any mathematical algorithms are directly or indirectly recited. 8' If a
mathematical algorithm is included, the claim as a whole must be analyzed
to determine whether "the claim [has] implement[ed] the algorithm in a spe-
cific manner to define structural relationships between the elements of the
claim ... or to limit or refine physical process steps."82 If the algorithm has
been used in such a way, the claim is patentable under § 101.83 Eventually,
this test was questioned, and although the court ruled it was not an improper
analysis, it pointed out that the ultimate issue has always been whether the
claim as a whole is drawn to statutory subject matter.84
4. The Useful, Concrete, and Tangible Result Test
In State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,85 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit further recognized
and supported the distinction between an algorithm and a patentable tool
that uses an algorithm.86 The court held that mathematical subject matter
76. Id. at 585, 587.
77. Id. at 587.
78. Id. at 589 (quoting Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728 (1880)).
79. See In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
80. In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 905.
81. Id.
82. In re Walter, 618 F.2d at 767.
83. Id.
84. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
85. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
86. Id. at 1373.
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alone represents nothing more than an abstract idea until reduced to some
type of practical application.87 This "useful, concrete and tangible result"
test further supported the Supreme Court's ruling that "anything under the
sun that is made by man" should be patentable.8"
5. The Machine-or-Transformation Test
In 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's
opinion in In re Bilski89 expressly rejected all of the previously mentioned
tests regarding subject-matter eligibility for patents under § 101 in favor of
the machine-or-transformation test.90
In Bilski, the applicants appealed a final decision from the Board reject-
ing all claims in their patent application directed towards a method for hedg-
ing against the risks of commodities trading.9' The examiner originally re-
jected the claims on the basis that they did not meet the technological arts
test; rather they only claimed an abstract idea.92 On review, the Board held
that case law does not support the technological arts test; therefore, the ex-
aminer's reliance on it was in error.9 3 Nevertheless, the Board affirmed the
87. Id. at 1373-75.
88. See id at 1373 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)) ("The repetitive use of the expansive term 'any' in §
101 shows Congress's intent not to place any restrictions on the subject matter for which a
patent may be obtained beyond those specifically recited in § 101. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has acknowledged that Congress intended § 101 to extend to 'anything under the sun that is
made by man."').
89. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
90. Id. at 966.
91. Id. at 949. The principal claim at issue read:
A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a
commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of:
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and con-
sumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said commodity at a
fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk
position of said consumer;
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk po-
sition to said consumers; and
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said
market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market partici-
pant transactions balances the risk position of said series of consumer transac-
tions.
Id.
92. Id. at 950. The examiner stated, "[r]egarding... claims 1-11, the invention is not
implemented on a specific apparatus and merely manipulates [an] abstract idea and solves a
purely mathematical problem without any limitation to a practical application, therefore, the
invention is not directed to the technological arts." Id.
93. Id. According to the Board, "the requirement of a specific apparatus was also erro-
neous because a claim that does not recite a specific apparatus may still be directed to patent-
[Vol. 34
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claims' rejection, holding that the claims did not involve any transformation,
which is necessary to make it patent-eligible subject matter.
94
Finding its guidance in Supreme Court reasoning, the appellate court
expressly rejected the Freeman-Walter-Abele test,95 the technological arts
test,96 and the useful, concrete, and tangible result test.97 The court held these
tests proved "inadequate" and "insufficient" for their purposes.9 8 Conse-
quently, the court adopted the machine-or-transformation test as the appli-
cable test for patent-eligible subject matter.99
1I. ARGUMENT
While the courts have used a variety of tests to answer the threshold
question of subject-matter patentability, the Supreme Court has refused to
acknowledge a rigid test. In Tilghman v. Proctor,'00 the Court stated that
"[the patent law is not confined to new machines and new compositions of
matter, but extends to any new and useful art or manufacture. A manufactur-
ing process is clearly an art, within the meaning of the law."'0 ' In Expanded
Metal Co. v. Bradford,12 the Court explained that the Court "did not intend
to limit process patents to those showing chemical action or similar elemen-
tal changes."'0 3 Furthermore, in Gottschalk v. Benson,"° the Court clearly
stated, "We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not
meet the requirements of our prior precedents."'0 5 Conversely, in Parker v.
Flook, 0 6 the Court acknowledged that an argument could be made "that
eligible subject matter 'if there is a transformation of physical subject matter from one state
to another."' Id.
94. Id.
95. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959.
96. Id. at 960. The court explained that neither it nor the Supreme Court have formally
adopted the technological arts test, and it chose not to do so here.
97. Id. at 959 ("[W]hile looking for 'a useful, concrete and tangible result' may in many
instances provide useful indications of whether a claim is drawn to a fundamental principle or
practical application of such a principle, that inquiry is insufficient to determine whether a
claim is patent-eligible under § 101.").
98. Id. at 959-60.
99. Id. at 966 (emphasis added). The machine-or-transformation test requires an appli-
cant to show their "claim satisfies § 101 ... by showing that [the] claim is tied to a particular
machine, or by showing that [the] claim transforms an article." Id. at 961. "[T]he use of a
specific machine or transformation of an article must impose meaningful limits on the claim's
scope" and cannot "merely be insignificant extra-solution activity." Id. at 961-62.
100. 102 U.S. 707 (1881).
101. Id. at 722.
102. 214 U.S. 366 (1909).
103. Id. at 384.
104. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
105. Id. at 71.
106. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
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[the] Court has only recognized a process [as patentable] when it was either
tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change materials to a 'different
state or thing.""'  The Court admitted, however, "that a valid process patent
may [be] issue[d] even if it does not meet [the] qualifications of ... earlier
precedent.1 °8
The Court has further "cautioned that courts 'should not read into the
patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not ex-
pressed."" 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
agreed, stating that "it is improper to read limitations into § 101 on the sub-
ject matter that may be patented where the legislative history indicates that
Congress clearly did not intend such limitations." 0 This is exactly what the
Federal Circuit did in In re Bilski, however, when it rejected all other tests
and adopted the machine-or-transformation test as the test for patent-eligible
subject matter."'
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's decision in
In re Bilski, it rejected the notion that the machine-or-transformation test is
the sole test for determining patent eligibility under § 101."2 The Court held
"that the machine-or-transformation test is a useful and important clue...
[however,] [t]he machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test."' 13 By so
ruling, the Court ensured the preservation of thousands of patents and bil-
lions of dollars worth of property.' 14
While ruling that the machine-or-transformation test was not the sole
test for determining patentability, the Court failed to offer any solutions or
suggestions regarding what else may be used to determine patent eligibility.
Did the Court intend to bring back the "useful, concrete and tangible result"
test from State Street? What about the Freeman-Walter-Abele and techno-
logical arts tests? Alternatively, is the USPTO free to create its own test?
107. Id. at 588 n.9.
108. Id.
109. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting United States v. Dubil-
ier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933)).
110. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (1998).
"The Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 [Patent] Act inform us that Congress in-
tended statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man."' Id.
at 1373 n.3 (citing S. REP. No. 82-1979 at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
111. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
112. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). It appears the court of appeals
misinterpreted the Supreme Court's previous statement in Gottschalk, thinking that
"[t]ransformation and reduction of an article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to the
patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines"' rather than a clue.
Id. (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70, (1972)) (emphasis added).
113. Id.
114. Software patents in particular would have been at risk had the Court found the ma-
chine-or-transformation test was the only test for patentability. As the Court notes, the ma-
chine-or-transformation tests fails to make it clear that software is patent-eligible. See id.
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Perhaps the Court was reiterating its "I don't know how to define it, but I'll
know it when I see it" doctrine." 
5
In the wake of the Bilski decision, the USPTO issued two sets of in-
terim guidelines" 16 in an attempt to address the issues left unresolved by the
Court. With respect to subject-matter eligibility, the USPTO offered a two-
step analysis:
Step 1: Is the claim directed to one of the four patent-eligible subject
matter categories: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter?
Step 2: Does the claim wholly embrace a judicially recognized excep-
tion, which includes abstract ideas, mental processes or substantially all
practical uses (pre-emption) of a law of nature or a natural phenomenon,
or is it a particular practical application of a judicial exception?' 1
7
Although this two-step analysis seems simple on its face, it leaves pat-
ent examiners with too much discretion in determining patent eligibility as
the guidelines do not refer to any past precedent. By ignoring past prece-
dent, it is once again left up to the examiners to define terms such as "claim
as a whole," "practical application," and "post-solution activity."
In keeping with the flexibility desired by the Supreme Court with re-
gard to patent eligibility, and the spirit that anything under the sun is pat-
entable, the USPTO should employ all previously used tests to determine
initial patent eligibility under § 101. It is not necessary to "throw the baby
out with the bathwater" and discard precedent in search of the test, rather
courts should continue to build upon it as a test. Because § 101 is merely a
threshold inquiry," 8 claims must still meet other requirements for patentabil-
ity, which will prevent erroneous applications from gaining patent protec-
115. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). With
regard to what constitutes obscenity, Justice Potter Stewart stated, "I shall not today attempt
to further define the kinds of materials I understand to be embraced within that shorthand
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I
see it.... Id.
116. See Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Acting Deputy Commissioner for
Patent Examination Policy, to the TC Directors (August 24, 2009), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/2009-08-25_interim 101_instructions.pdf;
Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Acting Associate Commissioner for Patent Examination
Policy, to the Patent Examining Corps (July 27, 2010), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/bilski-guidance-27ju12010.pdf.
117. Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, supra note 116, at 1-2.
118. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 (1981). "Section 101, however, is a general
statement of the type of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection 'subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title."' Id.
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tion while still allowing the patent laws to have the comprehensiveness in-
tended by Congress. l9
In Bilski, the Supreme Court identified three specific exceptions to the
"broad patent eligibility principles" of § 101: laws of nature; physical phe-
nomena; and abstract ideas. 2° The USPTO and the courts have spent many
years trying to determine what does not fall under one of these exceptions.
Because § 101 is only the initial question, it would be easier for patent ex-
aminers to determine what does fall under one of these exceptions; in other
words, examiners should seek to determine what is not patentable rather
than trying to determine what is patentable. For claims that do not fall under
an unpatentable exception, the USPTO and the courts should be able to de-
termine patent eligibility by following the steps depicted in Chart 1 below
and the explanation that follows.
119. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225. "In choosing such expansive terms ... modified by the
comprehensive 'any,' Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given




Chart 1: Proposed flowchart depicting process for determining
whether a claim passes the threshold inquiry of subject-matter patent eligi-
bility under § 101.
A. Does the Claim Meet the Machine-or-Transformation Test?
If a claim is tied to a particular machine or transforms an article, then it
passes the threshold for patent eligibility. This requires the particular ma-
chine or transformation to impose meaningful limits, and it must not simply
be a post-solution activity. If a claim is not tied to a particular machine and
it does not transform article, then move to the next step.
B. Does the Claim Satisfy Any of the Following Inquiries?
If a claim does not meet the machine-or-transformation test, but falls
into one of the following "categories," then it satisfies the § 101 threshold
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and is likely patentable. If it does not fall into one of these categories, then it
likely falls under one of the three nonpatentable exceptions-laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.
1. Technological Arts
The Federal Circuit rejected the technological arts test in In re Bilski
due to the court's opinion that the terms "technological arts" and "technol-
ogy" are too ambiguous and are frequently subject to change. 2 ' This dem-
onstrates that patent determination should be flexible enough to accommo-
date the ever-changing state of technology. Inventors are constantly coming
up with new applications for existing tools and ideas as well as new ways of
accomplishing tasks. A patent examiner could easily evaluate a variety of
claims by employing this simple test--does the claim fall within the techno-
logical arts meaning of the Constitution, meaning is the claim a practical
application of knowledge or a manner of accomplishing a task especially
using technical processes, methods, or knowledge? If it does, the claim sat-
isfies § 101.
2. Freeman-Walter-Abele
Although dismissed in several cases, 122 the Freeman-Walter-Abele test
was never intended to be the sole test for statutory subject matter when deal-
ing with mathematical computations. 23 This test is nothing more than a way
to distinguish an unpatentable algorithm and a patentable claim that happens
to include an algorithm. 124 Even though this test has recognized uncertain-
ties, 125 the test itself provides valuable guidance in determining the pat-
entability of certain mathematical computations. 1
26
121. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
122. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959; State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp.,
Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543 n.21 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
123. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 297 (Fed. Cir. 1994). "This court has made clear that
the Freeman-Walter-Abele test is not the only test for the existence of statutory subject matter
when computation is involved. However, the test is useful and, when met, ends the inquiry,
for it implements the principle set forth in Diamond v. Diehr, that "Congress intended statu-
tory subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man."' Id.(internal
citations omitted).
124. Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir.
1992). "The Freeman-Walter-Abele standard is met, for the steps of Simson's claimed
method comprise an otherwise statutory process whose mathematical procedures are applied
to physical process steps." Id.
125. Id. at 1063 (Radar, J., concurring).
126. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 297 (Fed. Cir. 1994). By definition, algorithm means "a
procedure for solving a mathematical problem (as of finding the greatest common divisor) in
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3. Useful, Concrete and Tangible Result
Section 101's use of the terms "new and useful" in outlining what is
patentable 127 clearly indicates the applicability of the useful, concrete and
tangible results test. This test differentiates between an unpatentable abstract
idea and an idea that simply uses an abstract idea in such a way that it is
reduced to a practical application. 28 This means an algorithm must be ap-
plied in a useful way to be patentable. 29 Is the law of nature, physical phe-
nomena, or abstract idea capable of being put to use? Is it serviceable for an
end or a purpose? Does the claim have a real, identifiable purpose? Patent
examiners should be able to identify unpatentable laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas by applying this test--does the claim
produce a useful, concrete, tangible result, or is it simply a claim on the
unpatentable?
Although future innovations and technology may test the outer limits of
this proposed standard, it should be flexible enough to accommodate most
inventions while allowing modifications to include any new categories the
Board or the courts discover. With the recent passage of the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act,'3" the first major overhaul of the patent laws since the
Patent Act of 1953, § 101 was one of the few sections not changed,' 3' mean-
ing it is even more important to give patent professionals an easy to under-
stand and easy to follow standard for patentability.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although misunderstood by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit, the Supreme Court of the United States has consistently warned against
the adoption of a rigid rule for determining patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C.
a finite number of steps." Algorithm Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/algorithm (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).
127. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
128. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978). "Unpatentable mathematical algorithms
are identifiable by showing they are merely abstract ideas constituting disembodied concepts
or truths that are not 'useful."' State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149
F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
129. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d at 1373. "In Alappat, we held that data, trans-
formed by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations to produce a smooth
waveform display on a rasterizer monitor, constituted a practical application of an abstract
idea (a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation), because it produced 'a useful, con-
crete and tangible result'-the smooth waveform." Id.
130. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
131. For a one-page overview of the changes, see American Invents Act of 2011, U. S.





§ 101. While the Bilski ruling seemed to turn the patent world upside down,
it actually corrected a mistake made by the lower court and, in doing so,
held close to the principle that § 101 should be construed broadly.
This broad interpretation allows new technologies and innovations to
be patent eligible even though they were not considered when the Patent Act
of 1953 was written. Because § 101 is simply a threshold inquiry and claims
are also required to meet §§ 102, 103, and 112 before a patent is issued,
there is no harm in allowing "anything under the sun that is made by man"
to pass § 101 scrutiny.
By ruling that the machine-or-transformation test is only a clue to pat-
entability and not the sole test, the Supreme Court preserved billions of dol-
lars of patented property. Simultaneously, the Court facilitated uncertainty
regarding how to draft claims. It is not necessary to "throw the baby out
with the bathwater" and completely ignore the previous tests employed in
determining § 101 subject-matter eligibility. These tests-the Freeman-
Walter-Abele, the technological arts, and useful, concrete and tangible re-
sult-still provide valuable insight into patent eligibility and should not be
abandoned. By joining all of these inquiries with the machine-or-
transformation test, the USPTO can create a meaningful standard flexible
enough to adapt to new technologies that is also easily understood and ap-
plied.
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